I maintain in what follows that type theory, although it appears tailor-made to solve the problem, does not actually forestall Grelling's paradox, but that the paradox remains derivable in spite of rigorously enforced type restrictions. (Jacquette 2004: 251) Jacquette's argument is based on the following 'definitions':
Definition (1) 
To see what is wrong with Jacquette's argument, reconsider the 'definition' (1). In writing the argument dependency (i.e. the free variables which occur) of the 
is not type-theoretically acceptable. For the order of any defined relation must be higher than the orders of its arguments.
To make the definition type-theoretically acceptable, we might write instead,
This is a type-theoretically acceptable definition. But this does not lead to contradiction (at least, not obviously). For H n+2 is, by assumption, a type n+2 relation and thus lies outside the range of the initial quantifiers. Furthermore, F n+1 is required to be a one-place relation, while H n+2 is a two-place relation. It would be a category mistake to instantiate a variable for one-place relations with (a constant for) a two-place relation.
In short, what is wrong with Jacquette's argument is that (according to his own intentions) the defined heterologicality relation H n+1 is a twoplace relation, with arguments F n+1 and F n . When this is clarified, the proposed definition (i.e. (5) above) violates type-restrictions.
The mistake here illustrates nicely a phenomenon in the theory of definitions, namely that the formulation of definitions must satisfy certain formal constraints. One of these constraints is that any free variable that appears in the definiens must also appear in the definiendum. Violating these constraints can lead to an amusing 'proof' that Peano arithmetic (indeed, any theory which proves that there are least two objects) is inconsistent. For example, assume the Peano axioms for arithmetic, and define a predicate 'P' as follows:
From (7), we can infer, (8) "y(P(1) « 1 < y).
Thus, (9) P(1) « 1 < 2.
And thus, since '1 < 2' is provable, (10) P(1).
But also, from (7), we may infer, (11) P(1) « 1 < 0.
And thus, since '1 < 0' is refutable, (12) ~P(1).
Does this remarkably simple argument show that arithmetic is inconsistent? No, it merely shows that 'definitions' like (7), and, similarly, Jacquette's (1), violate the aforementioned formal constraint.
